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Executive Summary 
This report provides the first progress assessment of climate actions launched at the 2014 UN 
Climate Summit in New York. It considers the distribution and performance of climate actions along 
multiple dimensions that are relevant to both mitigation and adaptation. While it is too early for a 
conclusive assessment of the effectiveness of climate actions, this study makes a first and 
indispensable step toward such an assessment. Initial findings are encouraging. One year after their 
launch, most climate actions have performed well in terms of producing outputs, putting them on 
track to implementing their commitments in the coming years. 
The research for this project is underpinned by the Global Aggregator for Climate Actions (GAFCA), a 
database developed between January and September 2015 by a research team at the German 
Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) and the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE). GAFCA includes data on organizational characteristics, 
geography of implementation and output performance of climate actions. It creates the foundation 
for a long-term systematic examination of climate actions that can inform more effective efforts to 
strengthen such actions. 
Our analysis is focused on three broad questions:  
 Have organizers of the 2014 UN Climate Summit engaged a wide range of non-state and sub-
national actions that set targets relevant to both mitigation and adaptation?  
 Do climate actions align with the interests of both developing and developed countries, and 
do they achieve an appropriate balance in implementation in the global North and South?  
 Have climate actions started to deliver on their commitments one year since they were 
launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit? (Output performance) 
Broad-based engagement 
The 2014 UN Climate Summit organizers have been reasonably successful at mobilizing beyond the 
‘usual suspects,’ i.e. governments from the North and large multinational corporations. However, 
patterns of participation also demonstrate the continued importance of ‘traditional’ actors in climate 
politics, in particular national governments and international organizations. International 
organizations lead half of all climate actions, confirming their crucial role as ‘orchestrators’ of climate 
actions, employing a wide range of measures to align stakeholders and their actions with public goals 
and international processes. 
The 2014 UN Climate Summit engaged a great variety of climate actions that are not primarily 
concerned with emission reductions. An analysis of target setting reveals that most actions do not 
aim at mitigation directly; instead many actions focus on adaptation or assume indirect effects that 
might result in emission reductions. If this holds true for a larger universe of non-state and sub-
national climate actions, then this is not sufficiently reflected in current research efforts and policy 
discussions that still consider climate actions as mainly mitigation measures. 
Balanced implementation 
Most climate actions have a global reach. This global orientation is consistent with the intention of 
the 2014 UN Climate Summit to gather leaders from around the world and to galvanize and 
strengthen action on a global scale. 
Strengthening Non-State Climate Action 
3 
 
Most of the coordination and planning of climate actions, however, is done in the global North. This 
may lead to the impression that climate actions mostly align with agendas of northern-based 
stakeholders. However, our analysis of implementation contexts indicates less of a ‘Northern bias’. 
Patterns of implementation correspond with the varying functional needs of different climate actions. 
Agriculture and resilience actions mostly focus on low-income countries, while mitigation-oriented 
actions often aim at more developed countries with a larger emission reduction potential. 
Output performance 
Our analysis shows that, only one year after their launch at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, most 
climate actions have taken steps to implement their commitments. Most actions produced outputs 
that fit some (36 percent) or all (29 percent) of their principal functions. This finding compares well 
with historical precedents. Ten years after their presentation at the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, 43 percent of ‘Partnerships for Sustainable Development’ still performed 
poorly, with many producing no output at all. 
While the overall findings are encouraging, notable differences can be found between various action 
areas. A large number of resilience and agriculture actions have yet to produce specific outputs. In 
contrast, energy and industry actions feature relatively high output performance, and seem to be 
well on track to deliver. However, the fact that many energy and industry actions predate the 2014 
UN Climate Summit raises questions about their ambition and their additional contribution in the 
context of the summit. 
It should be noted, however, that the lack of output performance in a certain action area does not in 
itself indicate failure. Many newly established actions may simply be in an early stage of 
development and will take longer to produce results. The lack of output performance in the short 
term may also indicate a high level of ambition. This is especially the case for actions in areas that 
have been relatively underrepresented. For example, the organizers of the 2014 UN Climate Summit 
demonstrated considerable ambition by venturing into the less well represented action areas of 
resilience and agriculture. Actions in these newly prioritized areas will need more time to deliver on 
their commitments. Over time, however, climate actions will need to produce matching outputs to 
achieve intended impacts. To enhance output performance over time, climate actions will need 
institutional capacity to realize their ambitions. Moreover greater transparency and accountability 
could motivate partners within a climate action to deliver on their commitments. 
Strengthening climate actions beyond Paris 
The need for climate actions does not diminish after the Paris Climate Conference. If anything, 
climate action will be more necessary than ever to help realize national targets, to develop practical 
solutions, and to demonstrate the feasibility of more ambitious commitments both from 
governments and the private sector. In short, a continued effort is needed to maximize the potential 
of climate actions. 
The findings of this study suggest strategic priorities and provide an argument for comprehensive 
and long-term orchestration by the UN and other international organizations. 
Regarding strategic priorities, this study revealed different patterns of development, ambition, and 
output performance across action areas and types of actions. Orchestrators would benefit from 
taking these patterns into account when designing strategic interventions to improve the 
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effectiveness of a larger range of climate actions. For instance, the organizers of the 2014 UN Climate 
Summit demonstrated considerable ambition by including resilience as a separate climate action 
area. However, this study finds that resilience actions are at a greater risk to lack institutional 
capacity to deliver. With output performance still low, orchestrators should prioritize capacity 
building in the resilience action area and foster robust organizational support and monitoring 
mechanisms. 
Governments and international organizations should also take decisive steps towards a long-term, 
more comprehensive framework for the engagement of non-state and sub-national climate actions. 
Through continued orchestration efforts, international organizations and governments can 
effectively respond to the changing nature of climate governance, one that increasingly features 
bottom-up dynamics and leverages the capacities of both state and non-state actors. More 
importantly, a much wider engagement of stakeholders will be necessary to halt global warming, and 
to realize a low-carbon and climate resilient transformation. Elements of a long-term, comprehensive 
framework could include: 
 The distribution and linking of responsibilities and orchestration efforts in a collaborative 
network consisting of the UNFCCC secretariat, intergovernmental organizations, 
transnational initiatives and research organizations; to the effect that orchestration becomes 
a shared undertaking that builds on the capabilities of multiple partners.  
 A navigable and regularly updated online platform that features existing climate actions and 
their commitments and synthesizes data on multiple (more specialized) registries. Such a 
platform would provide a systematic overview, which in turn enables a better understanding 
of a larger landscape of climate actions over time. 
 Regular reviews of the performance of climate actions, to provide accurate data for investors, 
civil society, researchers, policy makers, and orchestrators. Regular reviews also improve 
transparency and allow aggregate analysis, systematic tracking of climate actions, and the 
drawing of lessons learnt. 
 A capacity building facility that supports the sharing of lessons learned, brings together 
prospective partners, and supports governments and COP presidencies in their efforts to 
mobilize new and enhance climate actions. 
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1. Introduction1 
Urgent action is needed to prevent global average temperatures from rising by more than the 
internationally agreed 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. Governments need to show strong 
political commitment to take climate action, and seek an ambitious international agreement under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to facilitate and catalyze 
such action. Getting to a climate resilient and low-carbon future, however, is not a matter for 
governments alone – it requires innovative solutions and global engagement by a diverse range of 
non-state and sub-national actors. It is encouraging, therefore, that a growing number of cities, 
regions, investors, companies, civil society organizations and research organizations have initiated 
their own climate mitigation and adaptation actions, working either independently or in 
collaboration with international organizations and national governments. The importance of such 
private or public-private climate actions2 is now widely acknowledged. In September 2014, UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon convened a UN Climate Summit – with leaders from business, finance, 
and civil society in attendance – at which over 50 climate actions were launched. More recently, the 
Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) was launched to “accelerate cooperative climate action now and in 
the future in support of the new, universal climate agreement” (UNFCCC 2015a), and the French 
Presidency of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in December 2015 has declared climate 
actions to be one of the key pillars of the expected Paris deal. 
Many observers and policy makers suggest that non-state and sub-national climate actions have 
great potential to strengthen global climate policy. Climate actions can help reduce emissions and 
contribute to the adaptive capacity of communities that are vulnerable to the detrimental effects of 
climate change. They can also supplement the international climate process and national policies, 
increase capacities and establish transnational norms and standards to enable low-carbon and 
climate resilient transformations. By demonstrating the viability and scalability of solutions, climate 
actions could also help diffuse innovations and lessons learnt (cf. Hoffmann 2011, Chan et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, they can gather societal support for public policies that address climate change and 
they could help mobilize additional resources and climate finance to implement governmental 
climate policies and national targets. These qualities render climate actions particularly relevant to a 
climate regime that now features more bottom-up dynamics, and policy makers and negotiators are 
particularly keen to understand how such actions could help governments with the implementation 
of their ‘Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’ (INDCs).3 
                                                          
1 The authors thank Angel Hsu, Andrew Moffat, Amy Weinfurter and Jason Schwartz at Yale Center for Environmental Law 
and Policy for sharing their “Summing the Summit” data set, and Brendan Guy at the Natural Resources Defense Council for 
sharing the “Climate Summit Commitments” data set. We also thank Aarti Gupta (Wageningen UR), Birgit Lode (IASS 
Potsdam), Oscar Widerberg (VU University Amsterdam), Livia Hollins (UNFCCC), John Christiansen (UNEP) and Elizabeth 
Press (IRENA) for their advice on specific action areas. Finally, we are grateful to Maria Ivanova (University of Massachusetts 
Boston) and Charles Roger (University of British Columbia) for reviewing an earlier version of this report. It goes without 
saying that all remaining errors are our own.  
2
 Climate actions have also been referred to ‘climate commitments’, in particular in the context of the 2014 UN 
Climate Summit. 
3
 
For non-state and sub-national climate actions to help achieve mitigation targets in INDCs, it is important to 
provide for a robust system of greenhouse gas emissions accounting. This raises a number of methodological 
issues and practical challenges, such as the challenge of avoiding double counting of emission reductions (cf. 
Mosteller and Hsu 2015, UNEP 2015). These questions, however, fall outside of the scope of our study. 
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As the international community seeks to make climate actions by non-state actors an integral part of 
global climate governance, we need to develop a better understanding of the purpose and nature of 
these new initiatives, and whether they are likely to deliver on their promise of advancing global 
efforts to mitigate climate change and to adapt to its impacts. This paper presents the findings of one 
of the first comprehensive studies of the climate actions launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit. It 
offers an overview assessment of the over 50 actions, with a particular focus on three aspects: 
 the organizational characteristics of the climate actions, especially with regard to 
membership, main functions and targets, level of institutionalization and organizational 
capacity, and mechanisms for transparency; 
 the geographical distribution of member organizations and areas of implementation, 
especially between countries of the developed and developing world; and 
 the output performance of climate actions, which considers tangible results from actions 
and relates these to their stated functions. 
This report helps to fill two important knowledge gaps in the existing literature. First, it provides an 
ex-post assessment of climate actions presented at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, and thus 
complements recent studies that have estimated the ex-ante potential of climate actions (CISL and 
Ecofys 2015, Hsu et al. 2015, New Climate Economy 2015, UNEP 2015, Widerberg and Pattberg 2015). 
Second, this study offers a more comprehensive assessment of climate actions. Previous studies have 
primarily focused on emissions reductions (CISL and Ecofys 2015, Hsu et al. 2015, New Climate 
Economy 2015, UNEP 2015), while this study considers a wide range of functional dimensions that 
are relevant to both adaptation and mitigation. Futhermore, the methodology employed in this study 
is applicable to a multitude of climate and sustainability actions. Hence, this study could become the 
starting point of a long-term systematic examination of both climate and sustainability actions that 
could help inform policy-makers, and could provide them with a better understanding of the larger 
phenomenon of non-state and sub-national initiatives in global governance. 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. Section 2 provides background information on private and 
hybrid climate initiatives that have emerged in recent years, including those launched at last year’s 
UN Climate Summit. Section 3 briefly sets out the approach that we have taken in this study, and 
introduces the Global Aggregator for Climate Action database (Chan and Falkner 2015) that 
underpins our research (Annex 1 provides further information on the database and data collection). 
Section 4 then presents the main findings of our analysis of 52 initiatives, structured into three 
thematic areas: organizational characteristics (4.1), geographical distribution (4.2), and output 
performance (4.3). Section 5 summarizes the main findings and suggests directions for a long-term 
framework for engagement with climate actions. 
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2. Orchestrating Action: from the 2014 UN Climate Summit to a Long-
Term Action Agenda 
The nature of global climate governance is incrementally changing from a predominantly state-
centred affair to one that involves more bottom-up dynamics (as evidenced by the pledge-driven 
INDC process) and that engages more sub-national and non-state actors across multiple levels and 
across different international forums. The bottom-up, action-oriented trend does not replace the 
multilateral climate regime; indeed, the UNFCCC retains its importance as the host of ‘traditional’ 
intergovernmental negotiations (Falkner 2015), but new forms of transnational governance have 
emerged that force us to reconsider the relationship between public and private actors (Abbott 2012, 
Bulkeley et al. 2014). The increasingly fragmented pattern of climate governance makes it difficult for 
governments and international organizations to align the many actors and their actions with the 
global goals of mitigating and adapting to climate change. In addition to their established roles of 
facilitating international processes and assisting in the implementation of internationally agreed 
policies, international organizations now routinely engage non-state and sub-national stakeholders in 
international processes, by entering into partnerships with them, by showcasing their climate-related 
actions, and by bring both state and non-state actors to the table in order to broker or enhance 
global climate actions. 
This effort to align non-state and sub-national stakeholders and their actions with publicly agreed 
goals and international processes has been described as ‘orchestration’ (Abbott and Snidal 2009, 
Abbott 2012, Hale and Roger 2014). Through orchestration, international organizations can build 
positive linkages and create synergies that could improve a fragmented system of governance as a 
whole. For instance, international organizations could make use of high-profile intergovernmental 
processes to entice contributions from non-state and sub-national actors who want to be seen as 
‘part of the solution’. Conversely, international organizations could allow non-state and sub-national 
actions to showcase their actions in an international context, thereby demonstrating practical 
solutions and enhancing the prospects for an inter-governmental agreement. 
Within the UN system, links are increasingly being built between non-state and sub-national actions 
on the one hand, and multilateral processes on the other. The 2014 UN Climate Summit, also known 
as the Leaders Climate Summit, is but one recent example of orchestration by the UN. The summit 
was the culmination of efforts by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and his office to bring together 
leaders from business, finance, and civil society to broker new and joint climate actions. The 2014 UN 
Climate Summit sought to “galvanize and catalyze climate action […] that will reduce emissions, 
strengthen climate resilience, and mobilize political will for a meaningful legal agreement in 2015.” 
(UN 2014a) The summit, which has been described as a “different kind of summit” (UN 2014b: 1), 
was not part of the UNFCCC process. Instead, the UN Secretary-General convened a leaders’ meeting 
outside the multilateral negotiations to generate momentum towards a new international 
agreement to be adopted at the 2015 Paris climate conference. Furthermore, the summit focused on 
concrete action instead of negotiating targets or seeking a formal international agreement. 
Considerable effort by the UN Secretary General’s office went into the brokering of new climate 
actions. In addition, the summit featured an unusually broad agenda. For example, where previous 
engagement with non-state and sub-national climate actions mainly concerned mitigation (Climate 
Initiatives Platform 2015), climate resilience featured as a separate action area at the 2014 UN 
Climate Summit. At the Summit itself, 29 ‘action statements’ and plans (‘commitments’) were 
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presented, and many of the action statements subsumed and clustered several different actions. 
Therefore, the total number of actions investigated in this study is higher than the number of action 
statements and commitments (for a more extensive description of our unit of analysis and a list of 
climate actions see Annex 2). In total, 52 climate actions were presented in eight action areas,  as 
defined by the organizers of the summit (UN 2014a): agriculture, cities, energy, financing, forests, 
industry, resilience and transport. 
While the 2014 UN Climate Summit appears to be a rather atypical climate conference, its 
orchestration efforts are in line with other international efforts to engage non-state and sub-national 
actors. In December 2014 at COP20 in Lima, the Peruvian government launched the Non-state Actor 
Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), a platform that registers climate actions. At the same conference, 
the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) was announced as a partnership between the Office of the UN 
Secretary General and the Peruvian and French governments (presidents of COP 20 and COP 21 
respectively), to strengthen climate action “throughout 2015, in Paris in December and beyond” 
(UNFCCC 2015a) and to mobilize, support and highlight existing actions. 
Furthermore, governments and the UNFCCC process increasingly recognize non-state and sub-
national actors for their complementary actions. The negotiations towards a new climate agreement 
in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action (ADP) have repeatedly 
referred to the importance of non-state and sub-national actions in enhancing the pre-2020 
(mitigation) ambition, and broad support for such actions can also be found in the negotiation 
positions of a range of national governments (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015a). 
More climate actions are likely to be presented at the Paris climate conference. Once a new 
agreement is adopted in Paris, and national pledges have been affirmed, climate actions are also 
likely to play a more prominent role in contributing to national implementation, both with regard to 
climate objectives as well as broader sustainable development goals. 
Non-state and sub-national climate actions have considerable mitigation potential. For instance, Hsu 
et al. (2015) calculate that five of the climate actions launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit could 
narrow the gap between a ‘business-as-usual’ development pathway and a pathway compatible with 
a maximum average global temperature rise of 2 °C, reducing emissions by 2.54 Gt CO2e. Estimates 
of other sets of climate actions also indicate great mitigation potential. Blok et al. (2012) calculate 
that as few as 21 major climate actions could even ‘bridge the emissions gap between national-level 
action and emission reductions required to stay below 2 °C with a reasonable degree of certainty. In 
a recent United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) study, 15 major existing climate actions 
involving cities, companies, and sectors were estimated to have mitigation potential of up to 3.3 Gt 
CO2e (UNEP 2015). Similarly, climate actions by cities and regions could have a major impact on 
mitigation. For instance, commitments adopted by 238 leading cities could reduce emissions by 2.8 
Gt CO2e by 2020, and 13 Gt CO2e by 2050, equivalent to the emissions of all OECD countries in 2010 
(Arup and C40 Cities Climate Leadership 2014). These studies apply different methodologies that may 
lead to different estimates (Mosteller and Hsu 2015), but the emerging picture is that researchers 
agree that non-state and climate actions have significant mitigation potential. 
Climate actions do not necessarily contribute directly to the reduction of emissions, as they usually 
involve a long chain of effects. For instance, the technical examination process under the ADP 
features various climate actions as scalable solutions that could subsequently be adopted on a larger 
scale by governments. In fact, the most important impacts of climate actions may be indirect in 
Strengthening Non-State Climate Action 
12 
 
nature, for example when they demonstrate the viability and scalability of solutions, and could 
thereby help diffuse innovations and lessons learnt (cf. Hoffmann 2011, Chan et al. 2015). Moreover, 
climate actions can also leverage societal support for the implementation of governmental policies, 
engaging local and non-state stakeholders and increasing societal capacities to deliver on targets. 
Conversely, they also widen the scope of what governments consider to be doable, thereby paving 
the way for greater governmental commitments. For instance, when climate actions establish 
transnational norms and standards to enable low-carbon and climate-resilient transformations, 
national governments might adopt them at a later stage, which can in turn lead to greater uptake 
and even mandatory rules. These mechanisms do not apply to mitigation actions alone, they may 
also be relevant to resilient and sustainable development, and adaptation. Regarding adaptation, 
most studies indicate that few climate actions focus on issues beyond mitigation (Bulkeley et al. 2014; 
Climate Initiatives Platform 2015). However, even actions that primarily focus on reducing emissions 
are likely to have a significant impact beyond mitigation, for instance where they contribute to 
resilient and sustainable development and adaptation as co-benefits. Moreover, most studies may be 
overlooking climate actions that are primarily focusing on benefits such as adaptation (for an 
exception see: Dzebo and Stripple 2015). Adaptation actions are often more local and on a smaller 
scale, and therefore remain ‘under the radar’ when researchers and policy makers focus on ‘high 
impact’ and impacts at scale. Instead of categorizing actions under ‘mitigation’, ‘adaptation’, or other 
categories, we focus in our analysis on a broader range of functions that actions might fulfil in global 
climate governance, including raising awareness, lobbying, knowledge production and knowledge 
dissemination. Increased engagement of non-state and sub-national actors could also help mobilize 
additional resources and climate finance.  
Whether the expected potential of climate actions will be realized remains uncertain. The factors 
that influence the success and failure of non-state and sub-national climate actions are not yet well 
understood, and systematic evidence of the effectiveness of such climate actions is still scarce. 
Skeptical voices warn that climate actions may present ‘business-as-usual’ practices as clean and 
green, and warn that they divert attention away from the multilateral climate process. Developing 
countries, moreover, are concerned that a greater emphasis on non-state and sub-national climate 
actions might suggest that developed countries do not live up to their international commitments, or 
shift the burden of action away from those that bear the greatest historical responsibility. It is 
therefore clear that we need to develop a sound knowledge base about non-state and sub-national 
climate actions to better understand their purpose and potential, as well as effectiveness over time. 
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3. Research Design: Building the Global Aggregator for Climate Actions 
This section provides a brief overview of the research design and the Global Aggregator for Climate 
Actions (GAFCA) database that underpin the analysis in this paper. A more detailed discussion of the 
research methodology can be found in Annex 1. 
3.1 Global Aggregator for Climate Actions 
The aim of GAFCA is to establish a comprehensive source of information on the climate actions that 
were launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, with a view to developing a better understanding of 
their organizational characteristics, the geographic distribution of their membership and areas of 
implementation, and performance indicators. 
After defining the main categories in the database and establishing a manual for the coding exercise, 
the initial data gathering stage focused on publicly available data from individual climate actions and 
their partner organizations, most of which can be found in internet sources. These included the 
website of the 2014 UN Climate Summit, websites established by individual climate actions, as well 
as social media accounts maintained by climate actions and/or their partner organizations. In a 
second stage, our research team contacted representatives, focal points and partner organizations of 
individual climate actions to complement the internet-based data search. In a third step, our 
research team sent out a standardised survey to partner organizations and focal points of climate 
actions (see Annex 3). The aim of the survey was to collect additional data, in particular data not (yet) 
publically available, and to corroborate the initially collected data. Out of the 52 initiatives we 
approached, we received 25 survey responses between 24 June and 30 September 2015. To ensure 
inter-coder reliability in the data collection process, the data were coded twice by different coders, 
and the initial coding was corrected on the basis of survey responses. Four interviews were held with 
focal points and partners to contextualize findings from individual climate actions and action areas. 
Finally, our main sector-specific research findings (energy, resilience, industry and agriculture) were 
reviewed by policy experts and scholars, and the overall analysis as presented in this paper was 
reviewed by two scholars. 
In contrast to national policies and international agreements, climate actions by non-state and sub-
national actors have not received the same level of attention. Climate commitments by governments 
are continuously tracked (for instance in the Climate Action Tracker (2015), or the CAIT Climate Data 
Explorer (CAIT 2015), and national targets are regularly aggregated, which allows researchers to 
assess whether the international community is on track to keep below 2°C and whether current 
commitments can bring about a low-carbon and climate resilient future (UNFCCC 2015b). By 
collecting a large set of data across the entire field of climate actions, GAFCA extends this kind of 
rigorous analysis to subnational and non-state actors, thereby making these actions comparable. This 
should allow both researchers and practitioners to gain a better understanding of this new 
phenomenon in global climate governance. In order to improve international ‘orchestration’ efforts, 
international organizations and governments need to understand whether and where any gaps exist 
in the emerging field of transnational climate governance, and how well the individual climate 
actions are performing. The GAFCA database is designed to be extendable to other climate actions 
beyond those announced at the 2014 UN Climate Summit. GAFCA offers a relatively easy and cost-
effective tool for capturing a much wider range of non-state and sub-national climate initiatives that 
have already been created or are likely to emerge in future years. 
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In the subsequent section, we present the findings of our first-cut analysis of the GAFCA database. 
Our analysis is focused on three broad thematic areas, which we briefly introduce and explain in 
further detail below: the organizational characteristics of climate actions; their geographical 
distribution, in terms of membership and areas of implementation; and their output performance.  
3.2 Organizational characteristics 
The analysis of organizational characteristics is important because they influence the performance of 
climate actions (cf. Pattberg et al. 2012). The 52 climate actions in the GAFCA database show much 
organizational diversity. In this study we look at the functional characteristics of climate actions 
(what do they do exactly?); the transparency and accountability of climate actions (are their activities 
traceable?); and their institutional capacity (do they have what it takes to deliver?). 
With regard to the main functions that climate actions perform, this paper takes into account a wide 
range of roles in climate governance, from producing policy-relevant knowledge to disseminating 
such knowledge, training people, lobbying or consulting governments, or developing low-carbon 
products. Our intention is to capture the full breadth of activities that climate actions undertake. We 
thus go beyond the more limited categorization of functions into mitigation and adaptation activities, 
or climate resilience as per the 2014 UN Climate Summit. The second organizational feature concerns 
the question of whether the activities of an initiative are traceable, which is seen as a necessary 
condition for being able to assess whether it is delivering on its promises. In this context, we examine 
two specific characteristics: the presence or absence of clear and measurable targets, as well as 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Actions with clear and measurable targets enable 
performance assessment against stated objectives and are better equipped to deliver effective 
climate action. The presence of monitoring and reporting mechanisms improves transparency and 
accountability; it should also motivate partners in climate actions to deliver, especially when 
reputational gains or losses are at stake. 
Finally, climate actions also need a certain degree of institutional capacity to deliver on their 
promises and to successfully implement their policies. In particular, they need dedicated resources - 
financial, technical and human - to attain their goals. Well-resourced climate actions are more likely 
to move beyond aspirations towards implementation. While we do not expect a single organizational 
model of climate action to be associated with high productivity, we expect that a higher level of 
institutionalization, measured by a compound indicator that includes the presence of a secretarial or 
dedicated staff and the presence of monitoring and reporting mechanism, relates to better 
performance. 
3.3 Geographic patterns of implementation 
Climate change is a global challenge that requires mitigation and adaptation responses around the 
world. The analysis of geographic patterns of implementation helps to better understand the scope 
of climate actions (are envisaged impacts local, regional or global?), where decisions are made, and 
where actions are implemented (where are the beneficiaries?). Understanding these patterns is also 
of political importance. When climate actions are highly concentrated in industrialized countries and 
mainly benefit actors based in wealthy countries, or are perceived to be doing so, they and 
international organizations that seek to mobilize climate actions might not muster the necessary 
political support from developing countries. This risk has also been identified in previous studies, 
which have have found that many lead actors in non-state and sub-national actions are based in the 
industrialized world (cf. Bulkeley 2001, Bulkeley et al. 2012, Pattberg et al. 2012). It is possible that 
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climate actions can exacerbate existing imbalances when a large majority of them are led by 
northern-based actors and when the main beneficiaries are based in the global North. Conversely, 
international organizations and other orchestrators of climate actions are more likely to enjoy 
widespread political support if they are responsive to geographic imbalances, mobilize actions where 
they are urgently needed, and engage partners most affected by climate change,. Moreover, actions 
focussed on developing countries are also more likely to benefit the most poor and vulnerable 
countries and communities. An assessment of the geographic patterns of implementation and 
leadership of climate actions can therefore help determine whether the UN’s orchestration efforts at 
the 2014 UN Climate Summit were able to galvanize climate actions in the global South. 
Our analysis considers the geographic distribution of the members of climate actions, and 
particularly the location of lead partners, secretariats and focal points. It also examines how 
implementation contexts of climate actions are distributed between high-income, middle-income 
and low-income countries.  
3.4 Output performance 
Our study is the first to assess what climate actions have produced one year since their presentation 
at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, and is therefore an important complement to recent studies that 
forecast impacts based on self-declared commitments by climate actions (CISL and Ecofys 2015, Hsu 
et al. 2015, Widerberg and Pattberg 2015). We particularly consider the  output of climate actions, 
that is, the tangible and attributable climate-related activities and products that resulted from the 
actions, such as research publications, workshops, technical installations, websites, marketable 
products and campaigning material. Moreover, we assess output performance by considering 
whether produced outputs match the functions a climate action seeks to fulfil (see 3.2). For instance, 
a training manual would be an output fitting for an action that aims at training and capacity building, 
whereas the same output may be less relevant to an action aiming at campaigning and raising 
awareness to a large audience (see Annex 1 for a description of our measure for output 
performance). 
In our view, delivering specific outputs is a necessary condition to achieving desired environmental 
impacts or behavioural change. While it is difficult to directly attribute environmental impact or 
behavioural change to individual actions, outputs are easier to track and attribute. The assessment of 
output performance could be seen as the first step towards a deeper evaluation of environmental 
impacts and behavioural change.  
The assessment of output performance significantly narrows the number of cases for further 
assessments, because outputs are necessary but insufficient to achieve behavioural change and 
changes in environmental indicators. Moreover, the production of outputs indicates that a climate 
action is more than a commitment on paper, and fitting outputs indicate that an action has taken 
steps to implement its commitment. Further assessments of climate actions’ effectiveness will be 
necessary and could build on output assessments as a first-cut analysis. For instance, subsequent 
research could focus on actions that have produced fitting outputs and establish the extent to which 
they have actually met their targets (in quantitative and/or qualitative terms). In the meantime, the 
current report seeks to make an important contribution by: rendering a large number of climate 
actions comparable; balancing common assessments of pledges and promises by climate actions with 
an assessment of actual outputs; and providing an evidence base for developing a long-term and 
comprehensive agenda to strengthen climate actions. 
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The assessment of output performance in this report should also be seen in the context of 
international efforts to leverage novel and innovative actions. Relatively low output performance 
may be the result of ambitious orchestration efforts and pioneering actions that venture into new 
areas of cooperation – in which case low output performance may be a measure of high ambition 
rather than of failure to deliver. Over time, however, climate actions will need to deliver matching 
outputs to achieve intended impacts; in this sense output assessment could be part of a wider 
assessment of effectiveness. 
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4. Analysis 
In this section, we present the main findings of our analysis of the GAFCA database. As discussed 
above, we focus on questions relating to organizational characteristics, geographic patterns of 
leadership and implementation, and measurable outputs produced by climate actions since their 
launch at the 2014 UN Climate Summit. For the most part, we present results in aggregate form, for 
all 52 climate actions. The distribution of actions across action areas (as defined by the organizers of 
the 2014 UN Climate Summit, UN 2014) is uneven (see Figure 1), which complicates aggregate 
analysis of smaller action areas and limits the scope for comparing quantitative indicators across 
different action areas. Where appropriate, however, we present results by action areas that feature 
at least five actions (as in the case of agriculture, energy, resilience and industry) and compare them 
to the sample average. 
 
Figure 1 Numbers of actions by action area 
4.1 Organizational characteristics 
Patterns of participation 
The sample of climate actions emerging from the 2014 UN Climate Summit is characterized by 
considerable diversity. Some actions were launched by single companies (e.g. Walmart, Kellogg’s, 
McDonald’s), while most actions are partnerships between several organizations. In total, 943 
partner organizations are engaged in the 52 actions listed in GAFCA, averaging approximately 18 
partners per action. 
Although climate actions are commonly perceived to be transnational efforts outside the state-
centred climate regime, national governments and international organizations are the most frequent 
partners in climate actions (see Figure 2), while sub-national governmental actors (such as cities and 
regions) are the third most prominent type of partner. In spite of the UN Climate Summit’s emphasis 
on business and industry efforts, only 11 percent of all partners belong to this category. Moreover, 
the summit was only moderately successful at mobilizing other transnational actors, with non-profit 
organizations and NGOs, together with research and education organizations making up 17 percent 
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of all partners. This pattern of participation demonstrates the continued importance of ‘traditional’ 
actors in climate politics, in particular national governments and international organizations. 
 
Figure 2 Types of partners in climate actions 
When it comes to leadership in climate actions, although national governments feature most often 
as a partner it is international organizations that lead half of all climate actions (see Figure 3). 
Business and industry organizations take a distant second position as lead partners. These patterns of 
leadership confirm the crucial role that international organizations play in orchestrating climate 
action. The fact that international organizations lead most climate actions may also explain the high 
occurrence of national governments and agencies as partners. International organizations tend to 
have well-established working relationships with national governments and are accountable to them. 
Accountability relations in transnational governance institutions may not be as formal and strict as 
they are in intergovernmental institutions, but international organizations clearly see a benefit in 
involving national governments more than any other type of stakeholder. 
 
Figure 3 Types of lead partners in climate actions 
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Lead partners have also been reasonably successful at mobilizing beyond the ‘usual suspects,’ i.e. 
governments from the North and large multinational corporations (Figure 4). Out of the 260 
governmental partners mobilized, 80 (30 percent) were governments from OECD countries. Among 
business and industry, 32 percent belonged to the top 200 of the world’s largest companies.4  
 
Figure 4 Mobilization beyond the ‘usual suspects’ 
Functional characteristics 
To better understand the functional characteristics of climate actions, this study considered a wide 
scope of possible functions that climate actions seek to fulfil in climate governance. To take into 
account the multifaceted functionality of climate actions, up to three of the most important 
functions were coded for every climate action.5 As Figure 5 shows, climate actions seek to perform a 
wide range of functions (see Annex 1). Most actions aim to advance ‘policy planning’ – which is 
defined as the production of policy plans and the development of planning and policy instruments – 
whereas institutional capacity building (defined as the building of new institutions with or without 
legal status or the expansion and support of existing institutions) is the third most occurring function. 
Most climate actions announced at the 2014 UN Climate Summit thus seek to primarily support and 
strengthen public policy. Considerably fewer climate actions focus on lobbying or campaigning. This 
possibly reflects the priorities of international organizations (that most frequently feature as lead 
partners), in particular the UN and the organizing team of the summit. UN and international 
organizations are accountable to national governments and may be careful about engaging in 
activities to lobby governments directly engaging in mass appeals through campaigning. Surprisingly 
few actions engage in technical implementation and ‘on the ground action’ (for example, deploying 
new renewable energy generation) or the development of products that could directly contribute to 
emissions reductions. This functional pattern shows that this set of climate actions is not primarily 
concerned with undertaking concrete emission reduction measures. If this holds true for the larger 
universe of non-state and subnational climate actions, then this is not sufficiently reflected in current 
research as most still consider climate actions first and foremost as mitigation measures (cf. Blok and 
Höhne 2012, UNEP 2015, CISL and Ecofys 2015). 
                                                          
4
 Number of businesses in Forbes top 2000. See www.forbes.com/global2000/list 
5
 Most climate actions address multiple functions. Some refer to many functions that are not necessarily addressed with the 
same urgency. In order to both reflect the multi-functional character of climate actions and avoid focusing on secondary 
(less important) functions, the research team coded up to three primary functions. 
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Figure 5 Functional focus of climate actions 
Notable differences are found between the various action areas. In the field of energy-related actions, 
all actions count policy planning as one of their principal functions, whereas actions in the resilience 
action area are primarily concerned with institutional capacity building, norm- and standard-setting 
and the raising and provision of funds.  
Level of institutionalization/organizational capacity 
In launching various ‘commitments’ to advance climate action, the 2014 UN Climate Summit clearly 
sought to raise the level of ambition, even if the commitments are voluntary in nature. How likely are 
climate actions to deliver on their promises? Research on transnational climate governance suggests 
that high levels of institutionalization (Chan and Pauw 2014, Widerberg and Pattberg 2015)6 and 
clearly defined targets (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015b) are closely associated 
with higher levels of performance by transnational initiatives. In our analysis, we therefore examine 
climate actions’ capacity to realize their ambitions by focusing on organizational and monitoring 
capacities and financial resources. 
All climate actions need certain financial resources to cover operational costs and to invest in 
activities that support their aims. As we found, however, the financial capacity of most climate 
actions remains unclear, not least because publicly available information on their financing is scarce. 
                                                          
6
 
A higher level of institutionalization may be associated with better performance, as it indicates that individual 
actions have the autonomous capacity to implement their own commitments. However, in the wider landscape 
of climate governance, the presence of many climate actions may lead to further fragmentation and possible 
inefficiencies. Although fragmentation is not necessarily detrimental (cf. Van Asselt 2014), multiple climate 
actions may address the same issues, creating overlapping institutions that may occasionally conflict with one 
another, or they may interact in ways that lead to sub-optimal outcomes (e.g. a ‘race to the bottom’). 
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Only 14 climate actions in our sample aim to provide or raise funds, and only about 29 percent of 
these have already raised or distributed funding. Of course, it is still early days for many recently 
launched initiatives, and greater capitalization can be expected as climate actions move beyond their 
initial start-up phase. However, continuous underfunding has proven to be a problem in the past for 
many non-state and sub-national initiatives. For instance, 65 percent of ‘Partnerships for Sustainable 
Development’ were still looking for funding four years after their presentation at the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (Biermann et al. 2007). If even climate actions 
that explicitly focus on raising and providing capital continue to struggle to secure access to adequate 
funding, then their effectiveness and that of other climate actions is likely to be called into question. 
Climate actions also benefit from clear target-setting and monitoring mechanisms to track their 
progress in meeting their targets. We found that just over half of all climate actions (54 percent) have 
set quantified targets (figure 6).  
 
Figure 6 Quantified targets? 
It should be noted that quantified targets do not necessarily mean emission-related targets. In fact, 
most quantified targets set by climate initiatives do not relate to the reduction of emissions (Figure 
7), although there are significant differences between the various climate action areas: The majority 
of quantified targets set in the energy action area relate to mitigation; most targets set by resilience 
actions relate to mobilizing and distributing funding; and many targets set by agriculture actions 
relate to the number of people positively affected. This diverse pattern of target-setting suggests 
that climate actions go well beyond the challenge of climate change mitigation, aiming instead at a 
wider range of climate and sustainable development objectives. 
 
Figure 7 Types of quantified targets 
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In addition, a large number of actions (44 percent) already have monitoring arrangements in place 
(Figure 8). This is an encouraging finding from the perspective of transparency and accountability. 
Greater transparency and accountability could motivate partners to deliver on their commitments, 
while also helping to make progress traceable in cases where clear targets have been set. 
 
Figure 8 Monitoring arrangement in place? 
Given the recent nature of most climate actions, it is encouraging to find that 44 percent have 
dedicated staff and/or a secretariat. For a majority of climate actions, however, we found no 
dedicated staff or secretariat, which may raise the question whether they lack institutional support. 
This does not mean, however, that all actions without dedicated staff or secretariat are bound to fail. 
Different types of climate actions require different types of organizational capacity, and some actions 
do not need an organization to administer activities following their launch. This is the case for the 
various declarations presented at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, such as the ‘Global Investor 
Statement on Climate Change’, the ‘Aviation Action Statement’, and the ‘New York Declaration on 
Forests’. Such declarations can become influential provided they are embedded in larger networks of 
stakeholders that voluntarily implement them. In such a case monitoring arrangements should not 
be geared towards efforts within and by a climate actions, rather monitoring should focus on the 
uptake and implementation by other organizations. Similarly, the organization of mass mobilization 
actions, such as the ‘Global Divest-Invest Movement,’ relies on support from and implementation by 
many – potentially informal – networks, which makes it difficult to attribute impacts to a particular 
action. However, most climate actions engage a more limited number of organizational partners and 
need dedicated staff or secretariats to coordinate and implement joint activities. 
Our analysis also finds considerable variation in the level of institutionalization (measured in terms of 
the presence of monitoring arrangements and dedicated staff or secretariats,7 see Figure 9) across 
different climate action areas. A relatively low level of institutionalization can be observed among 
resilience and energy actions, while a medium to high level of institutionalization can be found 
among agriculture actions. It is worth noting that a low level of institutionalization does not 
necessarily preclude effectiveness. For instance, climate actions in the energy area are more likely 
than other actions to be nested within larger organizations or initiatives, such as the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) or SE4ALL (Sustainable Energy for All), and therefore do not 
require an autonomous organization. Similarly, several actions in the industry action area were 
launched under the umbrella of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC). In such cases, newly 
introduced actions may perform better because they benefit from the support and experience of 
more established organizations with a track record of programme delivery. In fact, by other 
definitions of institutionalization that include situations of institutional embeddedness, some actions 
that we have analyzed might be considered as having high institutionalization (see findings in Section 
                                                          
7
 These two metrics are used as proxy indicators for an initiative’s accountability and autonomy, which will 
affect an initiative’s capacity to carry out its stated objectives. 
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4.4). Furthermore, some functions, do not necessarily require a high level of institutionalization or 
detailed monitoring functions; for instance, knowledge dissemination could be a one-off activity by 
making data available on an online platform (that may or may not be regularly updated). However, in 
the case of the climate actions in the resilience action area, the low level of institutionalization does 
raise questions about their capacity to deliver on their targets. Most resilience actions aim at 
institutional capacity building and raising and distributing funding, while few established 
organizations promote resilience as a separate action area. Resilience actions are therefore at a 
comparatively greater risk of suffering from institutional capacity gaps if they lack robust 
organizational support and monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Figure 9 Level of institutionalization 
4.2 Geographic patterns of implementation 
Geographic scope 
Because climate change impacts are felt globally, climate actions ought to also take place worldwide. 
A closer look at the geographic scope of climate actions gives an indication of whether impacts will 
be local, national, (world) regional, or global. There is considerable variation among the 52 actions. 
Some actions are focused on single countries, such as Nigeria’s ‘National Agricultural Resilience 
Framework and the Planting with Peace Program’ and Costa Rica’s ‘Environmental Services 
Recognition Program’. However, most actions have a broader geographic focus, on continents (e.g. 
the ‘Africa Climate Smart Agriculture Alliance’), or globally (e.g. ‘Global Geothermal Alliance’). The 
vast majority of climate actions target several countries, either with a global focus (61 percent) or 
focused on certain world regions (22 percent) (Figure 10). Agriculture is the main action area where 
at least a small share of individual initiatives (18 percent) is aimed at national or sub-national 
implementation. The predominantly global orientation is consistent with the intention of the 2014 
UN Climate Summit, which aimed to gather leaders from around the world and to galvanize and 
catalyze climate action at a large scale. 
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Figure 10 Geographic scope 
North-South balance 
While the majority of climate actions are indeed global in orientation, how are they divided between 
the global North and South? While most of the mitigation potential can be found in developed and 
emerging economies, the need for resilience and adaptation is usually greatest in developing 
countries (e.g. need for preparedness to droughts). Moreover, the differentiated effects of climate 
actions are a contentious political issue because of the perception that non-state and sub-national 
actions are mostly led by developed country organizations. This perception has been reflected in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, where developed countries have often been more supportive of building 
stronger links between the international climate regime and non-state and sub-national action than 
developing countries. 
Although patterns of participation shows considerable engagement beyond the ‘usual suspects’ (see 
Figure 4), data on the location of secretariats, lead organizations and focal points indicate a 
significant North-South imbalance, with the majority of climate actions being coordinated from North 
America and Western Europe (Figure 11). Because half of all climate actions are led by international 
organizations, most of which happen to be located in the North but do not necessarily represent 
Northern interests, their dominance in steering such actions tends to distort the overall picture. 
However, the geographic patterns of location of secretariats, lead organizations and focal points 
does not become more balanced when we exclude these actions from the analysis and only consider 
the actions that are led by actors other than international organizations. Climate actions not led by 
international organizations are primarily located in the European Union and the European Economic 
Area, as well as in North America. This does not necessarily mean that climate actions primarily 
represent the interest of northern-based actors; in fact, many actions are implemented in, and 
benefit developing countries (see below). However, if most of the coordination and planning is done 
in the global North, it may lead to the impression that climate actions mostly align with agendas of 
northern-based stakeholders. More research is necessary to determine whether and to what extent 
this is the case. 
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Figure 11 Location of secretariats, lead organizations and focal points 
Given the global orientation of most initiatives, we would expect to see a widely dispersed range of 
areas of implementation by climate actions beyond the global North. This is borne out by our analysis: 
a substantial number of low-income and lower-middle income economies8 are among the reported 
countries of implementation by climate actions. 25 percent of actions are being implemented in 
upper middle-income economies and 25 percent in high-income countries (figure 12). Overall, there 
appears to be a reasonably balanced distribution of areas of implementation across low, lower-
middle, upper-middle and high-income economies.9 
 
Figure 12 Implementation contexts of climate actions 
                                                          
8
 We classified countries of implementation by country groups by income, as defined by the World Bank. 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups, accessed 14 July 2015. 
9
 Further research could extend the analysis of country distribution to the distribution of initiatives according to 
countries’ populations, shares in global emissions, etc. 
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Significant differences in the geographic distribution of areas of implementation can be observed, 
however, between different climate action areas. For example, the majority of reported countries of 
implementation in the resilience and agriculture action areas concern low-income and lower-middle 
economies (Figure 13), while most industry commitments focus on high-income or upper-middle 
income economies.  
 
Figure 13 Implementation contexts by action area 
These patterns of implementation correspond with the varying functional needs of different climate 
actions. Actions focused more on adaptation needs may seek to target the most vulnerable countries 
and communities, in particular in the agriculture and resilience action areas, while mitigation-
oriented initiatives (e.g. in the energy and industry sectors) may aim for implementation in high-
income countries with a larger emission reduction potential. Overall, this analysis indicates less of a 
‘Northern bias’ when it comes to the implementation by climate actions. 
4.3 Output performance 
As discussed in section 3, we examine the outputs of climate actions (i.e. tangible and attributable 
activities), not as a direct measure of their effectiveness but as a necessary condition for them to 
achieve desired impacts. We are therefore interested in the degree to which the outputs produced 
match the functions of climate actions (so-called function-output-fit, see Annex 1). 
Our analysis shows that, only one year after their launch at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, most 
climate actions have produced outputs that fit some (36 percent) or all (29 percent) of their main 
functions (Figure 14).  
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Figure 14 Output performance by climate actions one year after their launch 
This finding compares well with historical precedents. Ten years after their presentation at the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, 43 percent of Partnerships for Sustainable Development 
still performed poorly, with many producing no output at all (Pattberg et al. 2012) (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 15 Output performance of climate actions compared to Partnerships for Sustainable Development 
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However, significant differences can be observed in the level of output performance across action 
areas (Figure 15). Compared to the total sample of climate actions, energy actions show relatively 
high output performance, while most resilience actions and agriculture actions currently perform 
below average. Of the resilience actions, 71 percent have yet to produce outputs, compared to 27 
percent in the total sample.  
 
Figure 16 Output performance by action area 
One reason for the lower level of activity and output performance of agricultural and resilience 
actions is the fact that the vast majority of them were only launched in 2014. Only two of the 
agriculture actions (‘Costa Rica: Environmental Services Recognition Program’; ‘Global Research 
Alliance for Agriculture on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases’ [GRA]) were fully operational at the time 
of the UN Climate Summit in September 2014. By comparison, many of the energy actions, which 
show a higher level of output performance, were already operating before the 2014 UN Climate 
Summit and therefore had a head start in producing fitting outputs. Many energy actions are also 
backed by pre-existing and well-established international organizations. Energy actions such as the 
‘Global Fuel Economy Initiative’, ‘en.lighten’ initiative and Global Partnership on Appliances and 
Equipment, commenced well before 2014, while the ‘Global Energy Efficiency Accelerator Platform,’ 
which began in 2014, is a flagship initiative by SE4ALL that has already produced a considerable body 
of work thanks in part to the backing and support of the larger organization. 
Some caution is needed in interpreting these findings. The lack of output performance in a certain 
action area does not in itself indicate failure. Many newly established actions may simply be in an 
early stage of development and will take longer to deliver first results. It thus still remains to be seen 
whether the large number of agriculture and resilience actions can become effective tools for 
achieving their stated climate objectives. Alternatively, a lack of output performance in the short 
term may indicate a high level of ambition behind the creation of certain climate actions in areas 
where delivering outputs is generally difficult and takes a more sustained effort. For instance, 
resilience actions had hardly been recognized in international climate processes until the 2014 UN 
Climate Summit, and little experience exists with setting up actions in this area. Further analysis, of 
both the contextual factors and long-term performance of actions, is needed before we can arrive at 
more meaningful assessments of their output performance, and ultimately their effectiveness. 
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4.4 Findings and observations from selected action areas 
In the following, we present individualized findings and observations for four action areas that 
feature the majority of actions: agriculture, energy, resilience and industry. Given that our research 
design and the database approach of our study is more suitable for aggregate analysis (as presented 
above), we only offer a qualitative assessment of these action areas, employing GAFCA data 
descriptively, and supplementing them with context-specific observations, based on input from 
experts in these action areas.  
Agriculture 
Agriculture is closely connected to both climate change adaptation and mitigation, and these linkages 
are complex. On the one hand, climate change has predominantly negative effects on food 
production as it affects the economic gains from agriculture, disrupts weather patterns, increases 
water scarcity, and influences the spread of pests and plant diseases. Moreover, some mitigation 
actions, such as those that stimulate large-scale use of bio-energy, can undermine food security. On 
the other hand, agricultural production and the conversion of forests into farmland are major 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Taken together, agriculture, forestry and land use changes are 
the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions after the energy sector, contributing just under 25% 
of all manmade greenhouse gas emissions (Smith, et al. 2014). As a large source of emissions, the 
agriculture sector could also make considerable mitigation contributions with an abatement 
potential ranging from 4.2 to 10.4 Gt CO2e per year by 2030 (New Climate Economy 2014). 
International efforts are held back, however, by the diverse and decentralized nature of agricultural 
practices and policies, and sometimes by a lack of incentives to contribute to low-carbon and 
climate-resilient development. At the 2014 UN Climate Summit, agriculture has therefore rightly 
been identified as a priority action area. 
It is encouraging to see that the largest number of actions was launched in the agriculture action area. 
The interest in agriculture actions was very diverse, not just limited to industry, but also research 
institutes and civil society groups. As a result, we observe a very wide range of agriculture actions. 
Some are fairly small and targeted programmes, for example, ‘CSA Youth Group: Mainstreaming 
Youth and Persons Living with Disabilities in Climate-Smart Agriculture’ with a budget of just $45,000 
over a period of two years. Others, such as IFAD’s ‘Small Farms, Big Impacts’ programme, are large 
funding programmes, supported by multilateral development banks and aid agencies. Many of the 
actions are directly aimed at improving livelihoods and climate resilience of small farmers, which has 
the potential to make a significant contribution on the ground. For instance, the ‘Africa Climate-
Smart Agriculture Alliance’ and ‘IFAD: Small Farms, Big Impacts: Helping Smallholder Farmers Adapt 
to Climate Change’ have been set up to increase climate resilience among specific numbers of 
farmers in developing countries. Many agriculture actions also perform other important functions, 
from knowledge production and exchange to training and research coordination (see Figure 5). 
A large number of agriculture actions have yet to produce specific outputs (see Figure 16). This may 
not be a reason for immediate concern, especially when most actions were only launched a year ago. 
However, tracking agriculture actions’ output over time is important because it helps to better 
understand what they are delivering, and whether they actually contribute to mitigation and 
improved livelihoods. 
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Energy 
Energy production and use are central to the functioning of the global economy, and managing them 
is essential to sustainable development and mitigation. However, managing energy production and 
use is complicated by the so-called ‘energy trilemma,’ referring to a conflict of interest between the 
goals of energy sustainability, security and equity (World Energy Council 2015). Despite increasing 
concerns related to climate change, states continue to prioritize energy security and access over 
environmental and sustainability issues (Dubash and Florini 2011). For instance, China – while 
installing renewable energy capacity at an astounding rate – also continues to build coal-fired power 
plants to serve its expanding energy needs (New Climate Economy 2014). While the chasm remains 
between what is currently being done and what needs to be done to decouple emissions from 
economic growth, considerable strides towards managing global energy emissions have been made. 
For instance, the establishment of IRENA has enhanced coordination and focus towards the global 
expansion of renewable energy generation. Renewable energy markets are also rapidly expanding 
due to declining costs in production. For example, the global solar PV capacity increased tenfold 
between 2008 and 2014 (IAE-PVPS 2015). Encouraged by these developments, the number of 
countries setting renewable energy targets also increased almost ten-fold, from 15 countries in 2005 
to 144 in 2014. Energy actions, such as the ones proposed at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, have 
emerged as supplementary approaches to go beyond current efforts by international organizations 
and states. Climate actions potentially provide additional knowledge, policy experimentation and 
funding to realize concrete projects that tackle climate change from the bottom-up (Blok, et al. 2012). 
They could also inspire actors across multiple levels of governance to reduce their carbon footprints 
and to undertake adaptation measures.  
As is the case with other climate actions presented at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, it is difficult to 
paint energy climate actions with one broad brushstroke because of their great diversity. 
Nonetheless, the set of energy actions stands out for its higher-than-average output performance 
(see Figure 16). This could partly be explained by the fact that a number of actions commenced 
before 2014, giving them a head start in producing outputs. The announcement of already existing 
actions at the 2014 UN Climate Summit might cast doubt about whether these actions are truly new 
and additional. Another factor impacting output performance relates to the level of 
institutionalization (see Figure 9). Strong backing by large organizations provided energy actions 
greater institutional support, better access to funding, and wide-ranging networks. For instance, the 
‘Africa Clean Energy Corridor’, the ‘Global Geothermal Alliance’ and the ‘SIDS Lighthouses Initiative’ 
are nested within IRENA. While institutional nesting, as a type of institutionalization, was not 
accounted for in the measurement of the level of institutionalization in GAFCA, it may have positively 
impacted output performance. We also observed that, within a group of actions belonging to the 
‘Energy Efficiency Accelerator Platform’ initiated by the UN sponsored ‘Sustainable Energy for All 
initiative’ (SE4ALL), existing actions with standing organizations such as en.lighten and the Global 
Fuel Economy Initiative performed better in terms of outputs. However, newer actions, such as the 
‘District Energy Accelerator’ and the ‘Building Efficiency Accelerator,’ have been less successful. As 
with renewable energy actions, energy efficiency actions are likely to benefit from improved 
coordination and an enabling institutional environment. The ‘Energy Efficiency Accelerator Platform’ 
has recognized this shortcoming and has recently set up a full-time secretariat to remedy the lack of 
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coordination between various ‘sub-accelerators’ and also to support actions that have not yet 
produced outputs.10 
At first glance, the primary functional scope of energy actions is mitigation, as most actions concern 
emission reductions. Surprisingly few energy actions, however, set quantified targets (see Figure 6). 
A closer look at the functions that energy actions address reveals a wider functional scope of 
activities. For instance, the most addressed functions — knowledge dissemination and policy 
planning — cannot be easily monitored by quantitative measures (see Figure 5). The geographic 
scope of energy actions also stands out for its breadth. Most energy actions have a global focus (see 
Figure 10), and it is particularly encouraging to see that low-carbon energy transition through energy 
actions is not limited to the global North (see Figure 13). 
The emerging overall picture of energy actions is encouraging. Energy actions perform well in terms 
of output effectiveness (see Figure 16), and wide functional and geographic scopes can help them to 
deliver to communities in both developing and developed countries. We also observe a positive 
institutional context for energy actions. Nevertheless, questions remain whether announced actions 
are truly new and additional, since a number of them predate the 2014 UN Climate Summit. 
Moreover, the emphasis on mitigation is often not matched by quantitative target setting or the 
possibility to monitor emission reductions against targets. 
Resilience 
By taking up resilience, the 2014 UN Climate Summit organisers have ventured into a relatively new 
action area. Climate actions have mostly been associated with mitigation. Resilience and adaptation 
actions have been underrepresented in prominent data platforms, such as the Climate Initiatives 
Platform (2015) and the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Actions (NAZCA, UNFCCC 2015c), while the 
international climate negotiations towards the Paris climate conference in the ADP primarily refer to 
non-state and sub-national climate actions in terms of their mitigation potential. Moreover, the focus 
on resilience implies a more systemic approach than individualized adaptation actions, as it includes 
efforts that improve the capabilities of social and ecological systems to absorb impacts of climate 
change, as well as to renew and possibly improve these systems. The inclusion of resilience as a 
separate action area should therefore be regarded as an achievement in itself—a recognition that 
climate governance needs to address interconnected concerns particularly relevant to vulnerable 
communities in developing countries. Because of the encompassing nature of resilience efforts, 
however, it is difficult to define a clear focus as resilience actions cut across multiple substantive 
issue areas. For this reason, the Lima-Paris Action Agenda has taken a thematic approach focusing on 
water resources, food security, health and disaster risk reduction and coastal zone management as 
priority themes (Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015c). Resilience actions presented 
at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, however, cover only limited ground. For instance, none of the 
actions specifically addresses water resources or coastal zone management. There is a significant 
thematic discrepancy between resilience actions presented at the 2014 UN Climate Summit and 
priorities defined by the LPAA. Existing actions strongly emphasize disaster risks (e.g. ‘Promoting 
Disaster and Climate Risk Resilience through Regional Programmatic and Risk Financing Mechanisms,’ 
                                                          
10
 Interview with John Christiansen, Director of SE4ALL’s Copenhagen Centre on Energy Efficiency – a UNEP, 
DTU Partnership, on September 18, 2015. 
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‘Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility,’ and ‘African Risk Capacity’), while references to other 
priority themes are sporadic if not entirely absent.  
Resilience actions in our sample are exclusively led by international organizations, for instance UNEP 
and the World Meteorological Organization. This may reflect pragmatic considerations by the summit 
organizers to mobilize other UN and international organizations to launch new actions in time for the 
summit. International organizations have clearly taken the lead in resilience actions. They have also 
succeeded in focusing on the most vulnerable countries, as 44 percent of reported countries of 
implementation concern low-income economies (see Figure 13). 
Average output performance in the resilience action area is still low (see Figure 16), but this should 
not be a reason for concern. The fact that many actions have not yet produced fitting outputs 
reflects their early phase of development, and possibly high ambitions that cannot be quickly 
delivered on. It remains to be seen whether the current sample of actions will produce tangible and 
relevant outputs over time. The fact that the majority of resilience actions set quite specific targets 
(especially in terms of number of people’s lives improved and amounts of funding mobilized, see 
Figure 7) may contribute to output performance over time, or at least enable assessment against 
targets. However, a relatively low level of institutionalization (see Figure 9) raises questions about 
the capacity of resilience actions to deliver and meet their targets.  
A closer look at the functions addressed by resilience actions reveals a possible alternative 
conceptualization of resilience as an action area, not defined by thematic priorities, but by 
crosscutting functions that support systemic resilience (see Figure 5). Most resilience actions aim to 
enhance the use of data, for instance towards the management of risks related to climate disasters 
(‘Integrating Risks into the Financial System 1-in-100 Initiative’), or work towards the integration of 
data relevant for resilience (‘Climate Information for Climate Action’). The current set of resilience 
actions does not emphasize knowledge production and dissemination or the building of networks 
(‘participatory management’). Therefore, continued mobilization efforts should also focus on 
knowledge and capacity building functions that are vital to greater resilience. 
In spite of the novelty of resilience as an action area, procedural links between the 2014 UN Climate 
Summit, the LPAA, and the Paris climate conference have been made on this theme (e.g. COP21 will 
feature a ‘resilience day’). Institutional links can also be found in the international climate 
negotiation process. For instance, negotiations under Work stream 2 of the ADP refer to aspects of 
resilient development including sustainability co-benefits. To further resilience actions, the LPAA and 
possible follow-up initiatives should solidify, and build on, existing linkages. For instance, the 
Adaptation Committee under the UNFCCC already has the mandate to share knowledge and to 
strengthen engagement between stakeholders. These functions match well with a long-term action 
approach to resilience. Moreover, many adaptation actions are featured as case studies and Private 
Sector Initiatives (cf. Pauw et al.2015) under the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability 
and adaption to climate change, including those that address relatively underserved functions of 
knowledge dissemination and production (UFCCC 2015d). These adaptation actions are not yet 
featured in the NAZCA database, which remains mitigation-oriented in spite of its aim to register 
wide ranging climate actions. By building on existing efforts, an action agenda on resilience has great 
potential to deliver on both the sustainable development and climate agendas. 
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Industry 
The organizers of the 2014 UN Climate Summit included ‘industry’ as an action area even though it 
only includes five actions, far too small a number to capture the broad diversity of actions that is 
possible in the industry sector. 
The industry sector includes energy-intensive industries (e.g. steel, cement and chemicals 
production), food processing, waste management, wastewater treatment, mining, as well as fossil 
fuel industries. It is responsible for 30 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, of which about 85 
percent come from CO2 emissions (Fischedick et al. 2014). Industry actions launched at the 2014 UN 
Climate Summit cover a range of actions: oil and gas production, freight transportation, industries 
using hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and municipal solid waste, but all are concerned – at least in part –
with addressing short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs). SLCPs, which include black carbon, methane, 
tropospheric ozone as well as HFCs, have short life spans – compared to carbon dioxide  – but also 
have high global warming potential. SLCP mitigation could halve the expected amount of global 
warming by 2050 (Ramanathan and Xu 2010), and reduce overall sea-level rise with 22-42 per cent 
by 2100 (Hu, Xu et al. 2013). Although the the climate treaties (the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol) 
cover SLCPs like HFCs and methane, their focus has largely been on CO2. As black carbon is not a 
greenhouse gas, it falls outside the remit of the climate treaties. This means that actions to tackle 
SLCPs could form an important complement to other mitigation actions. 
The actions launched at the summit show how SLCPs are increasingly targeted through collaborative 
actions, in particular the Climate and Clean Air Coalition. Except for the ‘Oil and Gas Climate Initiative’ 
(OGCI), all industry actions launched are carried out under the auspices of the CCAC. While the CCAC 
itself is led by both state and non-state partners, the actions initiated under it foresee an important 
role for non-state actors. For instance, the ‘Oil & Gas Methane Partnership’ will be largely driven by 
the companies. Industry actions presented at the summit draw participation from a balanced mix of 
developed and developing countries, as well as international organizations, business and industry, 
NGOs, and sub-national authorities. In particular, they broadened engagement by the oil and gas 
industry in mitigation, as evidenced by the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership as well as the OGCI. 
Four out of five industry actions prominently address knowledge dissemination. In addition, several 
actions engage in standard-setting by working towards common methodologies and reporting (the 
OGCI), and in policy planning through promoting climate-friendly alternatives to HFCs. Lobbying is a 
key function of the ‘Phasing Down Climate Potent HFCs’ initiative, which explicitly encourages the 
adoption by states of an amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down the production and 
consumption of HFCs. Actions under the CCAC benefit from a small but dedicated secretariat in 
achieving these objectives. The OGCI only started recently, which may explain the lack of a 
secretariat or dedicated staff, and a lack of monitoring arrangements mentioned in its action 
statement. 
One year after the summit industry actions have performed relatively well in terms of outputs (see 
Figure 16). Most outputs recorded were in relation to the ‘Phasing Down Climate Potent HFCs’ and 
‘Municipal Solid Waste’ initiatives, which already existed – albeit in a slightly different form – prior to 
the summit. Other industry actions have produced fewer outputs, but activities seem to be ongoing. 
Websites are respectively launched and forthcoming for the OGCI and the Global Green Freight 
initiative, the OGCI organised its first multi-stakeholder workshop in 2015, and the Oil & Gas 
Methane Partnership and the Global Green Freight initiatives released their action plans in 2015. 
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Linking outputs to the achievement of functions, however, is not straightforward. For instance, while 
a range of proposals has been submitted to amend the Montreal Protocol to include a phase-down of 
HFCs, some of them stemming from states that adopted the HFC statement at the summit (NRDC 
2015), the causal relationship between the ‘Phasing Down Climate Potent HFCs’ initiative and states’ 
actions is unclear. 
Industry actions presented at the 2014 UN Climate Summit have been off to a promising start. In 
particular actions related to the CCAC are built on a relatively strong institutional foundation. 
However, a few cautionary remarks are in place. First, only two of the actions have expressed clear 
goals against which performance can be evaluated over time. Second, while the summit presented 
an opportunity to showcase actions it remains unclear whether they are new and additional (notably 
in the area of HFCs and municipal solid waste). Third, the industry action area did not include actions 
involving energy-intensive industries, which arguably is a missed chance for deeper global sectoral 
cooperation. 
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5. Conclusions 
Our investigation of the climate actions launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit in New York 
addressed two important knowledge gaps in the understanding of non-state and sub-national actions 
in global climate governance. First, this study considered multiple functional dimensions of climate 
actions that are relevant to mitigation, adaptation and resilient development, whereas previous 
empirical studies of climate actions mostly considered their mitigation potential. Second, this study 
assessed the performance of climate actions ex post, whereas previous studies mainly assessed ex 
ante what actions promise to do. Therefore, this study helps to shed light on the role of climate 
actions beyond their mitigation potential; and it also demonstrates that – at the aggregate level – it is 
possible to track the actions of a large number of actions in a comparative manner, and assess their 
progress. 
Arguably the most pressing question is whether climate actions can promote low-carbon and 
climate-resilient development. The picture that emerges from our analysis is encouraging, although it 
is too early for a definitive answer as most climate actions are fairly new and will need more time to 
become effective. International organizations have been able to mobilize many types of stakeholders, 
going well beyond the ‘usual suspects’ in transnational governance. Although some North-South 
imbalances persist, many actions target low-income and lower-middle-income economies, thus 
increasing the likelihood that climate actions will benefit the world’s most vulnerable people. Climate 
actions are also starting to deliver. Output performance after one year is higher than one might 
expect from previous experiences with non-state and sub-national actions. However, the chain from 
tangible outputs to positive changes in environmental and social indicators is long. Our output 
performance analysis can only be a first step towards a deeper investigation into the effectiveness of 
climate actions and the factors that contribute to their success or failure. 
While the overall findings are encouraging, notable differences can be found between various action 
areas. A large number of resilience and agriculture actions have yet to produce specific outputs. 
However, mobilizing actions in these otherwise relatively underrepresented action areas can be 
considered an achievement in itself, as a case of successful orchestration. A mirror picture emerges 
from the energy and industry action areas. Both action areas feature relatively high output 
performance and seem to be well on track to deliver. However, the fact that many actions predate 
the 2014 UN Climate Summit raises questions about their level of ambition and their additional 
contribution in the context of the summit. 
It is encouraging to see that the UNFCCC and other international processes increasingly create 
positive linkages between climate actions and international processes. The 2014 UN Climate Summit, 
although fairly unique among climate conferences, is not an isolated effort. Through facilitating 
information platforms such as NAZCA, which mobilize and showcase climate actions, governments, 
the UNFCCC and international organizations can generate increased visibility of actions, greater 
commitments and possibly higher national ambitions. However, continued efforts by the UNFCCC, 
the wider UN system, other international organizations and governments are not guaranteed if 
climate change slides down on the global political agenda. Limited resources and the absence of clear 
mandates may prevent orchestrators from mobilizing and facilitating climate actions at the same 
scale and pace, compared to what we have seen in the run-up to Paris. Yet, the need for climate 
actions does not diminish after Paris. If anything, climate action will be more necessary than ever to 
help realize national targets, to develop practical solutions, and to demonstrate the feasibility of 
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more ambitious commitments both from governments and the private sector. In short, continued 
orchestration is needed to maximize the potential of climate actions. 
The findings of this study suggest certain strategic priorities and provide an argument for 
comprehensive and long-term orchestration efforts by the UN and other international organizations. 
Regarding strategic priorities, this study revealed different patterns of development, ambition, and 
output performance across action areas and types of actions. Orchestrators would benefit from 
taking these patterns into account when designing strategic interventions and trying to improve the 
effectiveness of a larger range of climate actions. For instance, the organizers of the 2014 UN Climate 
Summit demonstrated considerable ambition by including resilience as a separate climate action 
area. However, average output performance by resilience actions is still low, and orchestrators 
should prioritize support for this resilience action area over more established action areas. 
Orchestrators should also take care to engage climate actions in a comprehensive manner, and 
create the best possible conditions for them to deliver on their commitments. To this effect, several 
suggestions have been made for improved frameworks for engagement (Chan et al. 2015; Chan and 
Pauw, 2014; Hsu et al., 2015; Hale and Chambers, 2014; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015; Pattberg et 
al., 2012; Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions 2015d). Elements of such a framework 
could include: 
 The distribution and linking of responsibilities and orchestration efforts in a collaborative 
network consisting of the UNFCCC secretariat, intergovernmental organizations, 
transnational initiatives and research organizations; to the effect that orchestration becomes 
a shared undertaking while building on the capabilities of multiple partners (Chan et al. 2015; 
Chan and Pauw 2014; cf. Widerberg and Pattberg 2015; Hale and Roger 2014). 
 A navigable and regularly updated online platform that features existing climate actions and 
their commitments and synthesizes data on multiple (more specialized) registries.11 Such a 
platform would provide a systematic overview, which in turn enables a better understanding 
of the larger landscape of climate actions over time (Chan et al. 2015; Hale and Chambers 
2014; Chan and Pauw 2014). 
 Regular reviews of the performance of climate actions, to provide accurate data for investors, 
civil society, researchers, policy makers, and orchestrators. Regular reviews improve 
transparency and also allow aggregate analysis, systematic tracking of climate actions, and 
the drawing of lessons learnt (Chan and Pauw 2014). 
 A capacity building facility that supports the sharing of lessons learned, brings together 
prospective partners, and supports governments and COP presidencies in their efforts to 
mobilize new and enhance climate actions (cf. Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate 
Actions 2015d). 
This study demonstrated a method that could be applied to regular reviews and the benchmarking 
for output performance, which could become a key element in a comprehensive framework for 
engagement; enabling orchestration to go beyond the mere recording of a high number of actions. 
                                                          
11
 This function could build on the NAZCA portal which already draws from multiple registries, but could still be 
improved to cover more actions areas. 
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The Paris climate conference presents a window of opportunity to take decisive steps towards a 
more comprehensive and effective framework for the engagement of non-state and sub-national 
climate actions. Through continued orchestration efforts, orchestrators effectively respond to the 
changing nature of climate governance, one that increasingly features bottom-up dynamics and 
leverages the capacities of both state and non-state actors. More importantly, engagement of a wide 
range of stakeholders will be necessary if we are to halt global warming, and realize a low-carbon and 
climate resilient future. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. GAFCA database and research methodology 
Structure of the database 
GAFCA contains data on 52 climate actions. To capture specific actions and to increase the reliability 
of the database, sub-projects and programmatically distinguishable activities were included as 
separate actions, even when they were collectively announced as single commitment at the 2014 UN 
Climate Summit. For instance, the Global Energy Efficiency Accelerator Platform was included in the 
database as five separate actions: ‘District Energy Accelerator’; ‘Building Efficiency Accelerator’, 
‘Efficient Appliances Accelerator’; ‘Lighting Efficiency Accelerator/en.lighten’, and ‘Vehicle Fuel 
Efficiency Accelerator/Global Fuel Economy Initiative’. GAFCA contains basic descriptive data on 
climate actions such as ‘name of climate action,’ website URL, and contact information. Moreover, 
GAFCA gathers data in six analytical categories: ‘actors,’ ‘organizational characteristics,’ ‘geography 
of implementation,’ ‘functions,’ ‘outputs,’ and ‘Function-Output-Fit.’ Data in the latter three 
categories was particularly useful in assessing the progress of climate actions one year after their 
announcement at the 2014 UN Climate Summit. 
Actors 
Data on actors provides an aggregate view of patterns of participation in climate actions. For 
instance ‘who participates in climate actions;’ ‘which type of actors lead climate actions;’ ‘how many 
and which types of businesses are involved in climate action.’ This data could be used to determine 
the extent to which climate actions involve underrepresented voices in the formal climate regime. 
Moreover, analysis of patterns of participation could also indicate to what degree climate actions are 
‘northern driven’, or orchestrated by international organizations. These questions are particularly 
relevant in the context of UNFCCC climate negotiations, in which developed countries have 
encouraged further engagement with non-state and sub-national actors, while some developing 
countries and NGOs are concerned about, for instance, the ‘privatization’ of aspects of climate 
governance. 
Organizational characteristics 
GAFCA gathers data on organizational characteristics, such as monitoring arrangements, staff, 
duration of actions, and target setting. Deeper institutionalization of non-state and sub-national 
initiatives has been associated with greater effectiveness in current studies of public-private 
partnerships (cf. Pattberg et al. 2012). Some organizational characteristics could influence the 
likelihood that a climate action will be effective. Moreover, target-setting could indicate the potential 
of climate actions, and the areas to which climate actions seek to contribute (e.g. mitigation or 
adaptation). Early indications of potential and target-setting can be helpful for governments and 
international organizations when they decide to highlight particularly ambitious climate actions. Early 
indication of target-setting and institutionalization could also prevent an overly close association 
between formal (intergovernmental) climate process and actions that will likely turn out to be 
‘business as usual.’  
Geography of implementation 
GAFCA gathers data on the countries of implementation of climate actions. This type of data allows 
for a better understanding of the geographic focus of climate initiatives—for instance: ‘which 
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countries benefit most from investments through climate initiatives?’ In the context of global climate 
governance, this question is extremely relevant because the greatest financial and policy deficits 
related to climate change are found in developing countries, in particular the least developed ones. 
By revealing geographic imbalances in implementation, aggregate analysis can help international 
organizations and governments undo some of these imbalances. 
Functions 
In contrast to most current climate action tracking initiatives and research projects that primarily 
focus on mitigation, GAFCA applies a method that works equally well for actions with other goals. 
GAFCA classifies twelve different functions that climate actions potentially fulfil in the context of 
global climate governance (see Table 1). This allows for a better understanding of the role that 
climate actions play in various climate policy areas, including mitigation, resilient development and 
adaptation. A clear conception of the functions of climate actions is essential for the progress 
assessment in this report. For instance, a climate action that aims at raising awareness should be 
assessed by different indicators than an action that aims at standard setting. 
Function category  Definition 
Knowledge production Production of knowledge, information, innovation (scientific or applied) 
Knowledge dissemination Dissemination of knowledge, including dissemination of 'good practices' 
Technical 
implementation and ‘on 
the ground’ action 
Implementation of previously existing technologies, (mitigation and/or 
adaptation) plans and policies, including pilot and demonstration projects 
Institutional capacity 
building (governments 
and formal institutions) 
Building new social institutions (with or without legal status, for instance new 
partnerships) or expanding existing support organizations 
Norm and standard 
setting 
Setting up new norms or standards or spreading the use of such new norms, 
including the certification of products. Excluding internal (organizational) norm-
setting and policies. 
Campaigning Campaigns, including raising public awareness on a given topic, and education of 
the public at large 
Lobbying Lobbying, restricted to pressure applied on governmental actors from non-
governmental ones 
Participatory 
management 
Participatory management and involvement of local communities in policy 
programmes 
Training and non-state 
and sub-national capacity 
building 
Training of employees, other social actors, or students (including school training if 
new curriculum is introduced with a specific  content related to climate change) 
Funding Providing funds for climate related project, or raising funds. 
Product development Developing new or renewed climate-friendly commercial products and services 
Policy planning Planning at national or regional levels (including the production of large policy 
plans, development or planning of policy instruments)  
Table 1 Function categories 
Outputs 
Outputs, or the attributable and tangible products of climate actions, are a minimal condition for 
effectiveness. An action that does not produce any output could safely be assumed to be ineffective 
by all measures. By contrast, the production of outputs at least indicates the existence and 
productivity of a climate action. Without matching outputs, effectiveness (in particular ‘outcome’ 
[behavioural change] and ‘impact’ [degree of problem solving]) is very unlikely. While changes in the 
environment or behavioural change are difficult to attribute, outputs are much easier to attribute to 
a certain climate action. 
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GAFCA classifies 26 types of output (see table 2). Gathered data on these types of output will render 
a more accurate view of the production of climate initiatives, and the actual role they play in climate 
governance. The presence – or absence – of outputs also serves as a strong indicator of subsequent 
(higher order) effectiveness of climate actions. 
Data type  Explanation/Key 
OUT_PUB_RES Any publication by the initiative (not by individual partners) documenting academic 
research, data-gathering for implementation, policy and action research.  
OUT_PUB_ADV Any publication by the initiative (not by individual partners) arguing in favour of the 
partnership cause with a wider audience than policy makers (public); including 
campaign material, newsletters, petitions, and promotion materials (such as posters, 
leaflets, and brochures).  
OUT_PUB_STA Any publication by the initiative (not by individual partners) setting out policy and/or 
procedural standards (excluding internal operating procedures) for application to 
climate or sustainable development issue.  
OUT_PUB_EDU Any publication by the initiative (not by individual partners) aimed at training, 
including best practice manuals and instruction materials.  
OUT_PUB_POL Any publication by the initiative (not by individual partners) arguing for specific 
policies (whether regional, national or transnational) with public policy makers to 
regulate and or manage climate (and sustainable development) issues. 
OUT_PUB_EMR Any publication by the initiative (not by individual partners) indicating emissions 
reductions as a result of an initiative's activities. 
OUT_PUB_REP Any publication by the initiative (not by individual partners) pertaining transparency 
and accountability towards its partners, stakeholders and wider audiences (such as 
annual reports, and [self-] evaluations).  
OUT_DTB Databases and systematically organized and retrievable information, including 
significant changes to existing databases.  
OUT_EVO_S2S Science-to-science events (co-)organized by the initiative.  
OUT_EVO_SCP Science policy interface events (co-) organized by the initiative.  
OUT_EVO_POL Policy-policy exchange events (co-) organized by the initiative.  
OUT_EVO_POP Popular events (co-) organized by the initiative, since New York Summit.  
OUT_EPA_S2S Participation by the initiative in science-to-science events.  
OUT_EPA_SCP Participation by the initiative in science policy interface events.  
OUT_EPA_POL Participation by the initiative in policy to policy exchange events.  
OUT_EPA_POP Participation by the initiative in popular events.  
OUT_ITT Construction or improvement of new and existing physical facilities as well as the 
application. Indicate with ‘1’ when an action produced this output. 
OUT_SOM Active and operational websites (including sub-domains), and social media accounts.  
OUT_INS_ORG Organizations, institutions and new partnerships and initiatives, (partly) brokered or 
set up by the initiative (excluding the initiative itself).  
OUT_INS_PIN New or enhanced public policy tools and instruments.  
OUT_INS_PAR New partners involved in the initiative and/or in public policy processes.  
OUT_FUN_RAI Funding raised for new and existing projects relating to climate action.  
OUT_FUN_PRO Funding distributed for new and existing projects relating to climate action.  
OUT_COM_PRS Any marketable or marketed new or enhanced products and services with benefits 
from a climate and/or sustainable development perspective, excluding consultancy 
services.  
OUT_COM_CON Provision of professional advice relating to climate (and sustainable development) .  
OUT_OTH Other type of output not in the list.  
Table 2 Output categories 
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Function-Output Fit 
To determine the output effectiveness and progress of a wide variety of climate actions, this research 
employs the Function-Output-Fit (FOF) as a measure to strategically indicate output effectiveness.12 
FOF has previously been applied to ‘Partnerships for Sustainable Development’ (Pattberg et al. 2012). 
However, for this research, function and output data categories have been adapted to better reflect 
the characteristics of climate actions. FOF is derived from data on functions and output, and indicates 
the consistency between outputs and functions. In terms of measuring effectiveness, FOF goes 
beyond mere output measurement, as it not only indicates production, but also whether produced 
outputs are consistent with (self-) declared functions. For instance, a climate initiative that declares 
training as its function could be expected to produce a curricular programme and to organize 
seminars. A training initiative that produces knowledge (and nothing else) may be considered ‘active,’ 
but its output would not fit its declared function. FOF carries little additional information on 
individual initiatives, but its application to larger sets of actions allows for systemic situation analyses 
(cf. Andonova 2014, Chan 2014), to illustrate larger trends and aggregated patterns of effectiveness 
by region or by sector. International organizations, as well as other entities that seek to orchestrate 
non-state climate actions, could use data on FOF to more strategically engage with non-state and 
sub-national actors (cf. Abbott and Snidal 2009, Chan and Pauw 2014, Hale and Roger 2014).13 For 
example, a below average FOF in one region could indicate the need for additional support, or the 
reconsideration of instruments that may have been considered universally applicable. Conversely, 
actions with an above average FOF in a certain region or sector may merit in-depth research, and 
perhaps recognition in international processes (such as the UNFCCC) as ‘highlights’ or ‘best practices.’ 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, FOF only measures what has been produced by climate actions so far. 
Considering that the climate actions announced at the UN Climate Summit are only a year out, it is 
possible that more outputs may materialize as actions mature, resulting in a higher FOF. This 
possibility is yet another reason for climate actions to be systematically reviewed as they progress. 
The determination of FOF requires an explicit and well-defined range of governance functions and 
explicit and well-defined categories of outputs as outlined above. In addition, FOF requires a 
theoretical linking between functions and outputs in order to determine whether and to what extent 
a climate action’s function(s) is matched by fitting outputs (see table 3). 
Functions fitting outputs 
knowledge production PUB_RES; DTB; EVO_S2S; EPA_S2S 
knowledge dissemination PUB_EDU; DTB; EVO_S2S; EVO_SCP; EVO_POL; EVO_POP; 
EPA_SCP; EPA_POL; EPA_POP; SOM 
technical implementation and ‘on the ground’ action ITT; PUB_EMR 
institutional capacity building INS_ORG; INS_PIN; EVO_POL; EPA_POL 
norm and standard setting PUB_STA 
Campaigning PUB_ADV; EVO_POP; EPA_POP; SOM 
Lobbying PUB_POL; COM_CON; EVO_POL; EPA_POL 
participatory management INS_PAR; PUB_REP; EVO_POP 
training and non-state and sub-national capacity building PUB_EDU; EVO_POP 
                                                          
12
 The FOF measure has been applied before in Pattberg, P. et al. (2012). For this research, function and output 
categories have been adapted to better reflect those found among climate initiatives. 
13
 In the context of orchestration in global governance (cf. Abbott and Snidal 2009) effectiveness analyses 
inform state, intergovernmental organizations, as well as others (cf. Hale and Roger 2014), to strategically 
steer, empower, support, and mobilize non-state action (Chan and Pauw 2014). 
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Funding FUN_RAI; FUN_PRO 
product development COM_PRS 
policy planning PUB_POL; EVO_SCP; EVO_POL; EPA_SCP; EPA_POL; INS_PIN 
Table 3 Function-Output-Fit 
Annex 2: List of climate actions presented at the 2014 UN Climate Summit 
A total of 29 ‘action statements’ and ‘commitments’ were presented at the 2014 UN Climate Summit. 
Many of the action statements subsumed different initiatives, sometimes clustering actions that 
existed prior to the summit. Such clustering and the subsuming of different initiatives complicate an 
analysis that is specific enough to make statements about e.g. the organization or the performance 
of an activity. To allow a more accurate investigation, we therefore counted different initiatives as 
separate actions. To determine these actions, we studied whether activities in the statements were 
described separately (e.g. by using different names, addressing different issue areas, having distinct 
logos and/or websites, or involving different sets of partners). For instance, the Energy Accelerator 
Platform was presented as one initiative at the summit, but a closer reading of the action statement 
shows that the initiative can be disaggregated in actions addressing vehicles, lighting, appliances, 
buildings and district energy systems (the first two actions existed prior to the summit). Rather than 
counting the Energy Accelerator Platform as one action, we considered it as five different actions. 
According our understanding and definition of climate actions, which includes subsumed and 
clustered initiatives, we find more climate actions than action statements and commitments, namely 
52 climate actions.  
  Name of climate action Action area 
1 Africa Climate-Smart Agriculture Alliance Agriculture 
2 Africa Union-NEPAD Agriculture Climate Change Programme Agriculture 
3 Solutions from the Land: Adaptive Management to Meet Food, Fiber, Energy 
and Environment Goals 
Agriculture 
4 Partnership to Create an EverGreen Agriculture Agriculture 
5 World Bank: Scaling up CSA for Impact Agriculture 
6 IFAD: Small Farms, Big Impacts: Helping Smallholder Farmers Adapt to Climate 
Change (Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) 
Agriculture 
7 CSA Youth Group: Mainstreaming Youth and Persons Living with Disabilities in 
Climate-Smart Agriculture 
Agriculture 
8 Costa-Rica: Environmental Services Recognition Program Agriculture 
9 Nigeria: National Agricultural Resilience Framework and the Planting with 
Peace Program 
Agriculture 
10 CCAC Agriculture Initiative Agriculture 
11 ICO: Encouraging the global coffee sector towards climate smart agriculture Agriculture 
12 Kellogg's Commitment to Help Improve Smallholder Livelihoods and Climate 
Resiliency 
Agriculture 
13 McDonald's Commitment on Sustainable Beef Agriculture 
14 Walmart Climate Smart Agriculture Agriculture 
15 WFP: R4 Rural Resilience Initiative Expansion to Malawi and Zambia Agriculture 
16 Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture Agriculture 
17 Global Research Alliance for Agriculture (GRA) on Agricultural Greenhouse 
gasses 
Agriculture 
18 GFAR: Empowering Farmers Organisations on Climate Change Through Better 
Foresight 
Agriculture 
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19 Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) Booster Agriculture 
20 IFDC/VFRC: Yield, Income and Climate Gains Through Smart Rice Fertilization Agriculture 
21 Compact of Mayors Cities 
22 Compact of States and Regions Cities 
23 The Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance Cities 
24 Global Energy  Efficiency Accelerator Platform Energy 
25 Vehicle Fuel Efficiency Accelerator / Global Fuel Economy Initiative Energy 
26 Lighting Efficiency Accelerator / en.lighten initiative Energy 
27 Efficient Appliances Accelerator / Global Partnership on Appliances and 
Equipment 
Energy 
28 Building Efficiency Accelerator Energy 
29 District Energy Accelerator Energy 
30 Africa Clean Energy Corridor (ACEC) Energy 
31 Global Geothermal Alliance Energy 
32 SIDS Lighthouses Initiative Energy 
33 Divest-Invest Global Movement Finance 
34 Global Investor Statement on Climate Change Finance 
35 Caring for Climate Business Leadership Criteria on Carbon Pricing Finance 
36 The New York Declaration on Forests Forests 
37 Oil and Gas Climate Initiative Industry 
38 The Oil & Methane Partnership Industry 
39 Green Global Freight Industry 
40 Phasing Down Climate Potent HFCs Industry 
41 Municipal Solid Waste Industry 
42 Integrating Risks into the Financial System 1-in-100 Initiative Resilience 
43 Resilient Cities Acceleration Initiative Resilience 
44 Climate Information for Climate Action Resilience 
45 Promoting Disaster and Climate Risk Resilience Through Regional Programmatic 
and Risk Financing Mechanisms 
Resilience 
46 African Risk Capacity (ARC), Extreme Climate Facility (XCF) Resilience 
47 Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) Resilience 
48 Pacific Chapter on Promoting Disaster and Climate Risk Resilience Resilience 
49 The Urban Electric Mobility Vehicles Initiative (UEMI) Transport 
50 The International Railway Association (UIC) Low-Carbon Sustainable Rail 
Transport Challenge 
Transport 
51 The International Association of Public Transport (UITP) Declaration on Climate 
Leadership 
Transport 
52 Aviation Action Statement Transport 
Table 4 List of climate actions 
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Annex 3. GAFCA survey 
Global Aggregator for Climate Actions (GAFCA) is a collaborative research project between the 
London School of Economic and Political Science (LSE) and the German Development Institute (DIE), 
and is led by Dr Robert Falkner and Dr Sander Chan. It aims at establishing one of the first and most 
comprehensive databases on climate initiatives by non-state and sub-national actors. The database 
will serve as the basis for comparative research into the roles and functions that these initiatives are 
performing. We also hope that the database will become a useful tool for the UNFCCC and the 
climate initiatives themselves. Initial results of our research will be published in the run-up to the 
Conference of the Parties (COP-21) in Paris later this year. Our project is supported by a research 
grant from the LSE’s Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. 
1. Please enter your name and position   
 
2. Please enter the name of your organization/initiative (presented at the 2014 UN Climate Summit)  
 
3. At what email address would you like to be contacted?   
 
4. Which of the following best describe the functions that your climate initiative performs (if yes, 
please give examples or simply enter 'yes'; if no, please leave empty)  
Knowledge production (Production of scientific or applied knowledge, information, innovation) 
 
Knowledge dissemination (Dissemination of knowledge, including dissemination of 'good practices') 
 
Implementation (Implementation of existing mitigation/adaptation plans, policies or technologies) 
 
Institutional capacity building (building new, or expanding existing, institutions or partnerships with 
or without legal status)  
 
Norm and standard setting (setting and/or spreading new norms and standards, e.g. certification 
schemes) 
  
Campaigning and education (e.g. to raise public awareness, educating public audiences) 
 
Lobbying governments 
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Participatory management (including involvement of local communities in policy programmes) 
 
Training & capacity building (Training of employees, students and other actors, as well as curriculum 
development) 
  
Funding (raising and/or providing funds for climate related projects) 
 
Product development (developing climate-friendly commercial products and/or services) 
 
Policy planning (developing policy plans or policy instruments at national or regional level) 
 
5. Does your organisation/initiative perform other functions that are not captured above in 
question 4? (please give examples)  
 
6. Please provide a brief list of the most significant outputs that your climate initiative has 
delivered (e.g. databases, publications, standards, events, institutions, products, etc.)  
1  
2  
3  
4  
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